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ABSTRACT 
Attentional tunneling, that is the inability to detect 
unexpected changes in the environment, has been shown to 
have critical consequences in air traffic control. The 
motivation of this study was to assess the design of a 
cognitive countermeasure dedicated to mitigate such failure 
of attention. The Red Alert cognitive countermeasure relies 
on a brief orange-red flash (300 ms) that masks the entire 
screen with a 15% opacity. Twenty-two air traffic 
controllers faced two demanding scenarios, with or without 
the cognitive countermeasure. The volunteers were not told 
about the Red Alert so as to assess the intuitiveness of the 
design without prior knowledge. Behavioral results 
indicated that the cognitive countermeasure reduced 
reaction time and improved the detection of the notification 
when compared to the classical operational design. Further 
analyses showed this effect was even stronger for half of 
our participants (91.7% detection rate) who intuitively 
understood the purpose of this design.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Air traffic control is a challenging task that takes place 
under a dynamic and uncertain environment. Air Traffic 
Controllers (ATCO) have to supervise air traffic on their 
radar while communicating with pilots to ensure the safety 
and fluidity of traffic. This activity requires focused and 
divided attention abilities to process local information while 
remaining responsive to peripheral and unexpected events 
such as conflicts (i.e. potential collisions) [6]. It is now well 
admitted that high workload (e.g. density and complexity of 
air traffic) may negatively impact attentional performance 
to an extent that ATCO can fail to perceive critical events 
[18]. Different “warning” and “alert” notifications have 
been developed to overcome such attentional impairment 
while keeping the human operator in the loop. Warnings 
that have lower levels of urgency are displayed on the radar 
labels with static red text, while more critical alerts 
currently use blinking colored text. For example, a Short-
Term Conflict Alert (STCA) is triggered when an aircraft 
does not meet the separation criteria (5 nautical mile 
longitudinal, 1000 ft altitude), leading to a flashing red 
‘ALRT’ notification on the aircraft track label (cf. figure 3-
up). Despite these technical improvements, a recent study 
disclosed that STCA could remain undetected [12], thus 
confirming the findings of the French Board for Safety 
Event analysis (ITES). Indeed, in 2013, the ITES Human 
Factors Group identified failure of attention as a possible 
issue and recommended to enhance the design of the critical 
alarms because of several events linked to the absence of 
response to alert notifications.  
A relevant approach to improve the design of alert 
notifications is to understand the mechanisms underpinning 
failure of attention. Different models have been put forth to 
account for this phenomenon such as a shrinkage of the 
functional field of view, also known as “visual tunneling” 
[22], or dilution of visual attention, also known as “general 
interference” [8].  Consistently with these hypotheses, some 
studies have shown that, depending on the experimental 
task, the detection of peripheral stimuli was adversely 
affected if they were placed at 2.2 degrees [22], 7 degrees 
[8] or 10 degrees of eccentricity from foveal field [15]. 
Vision research may provide interesting recommendations 
such as the use of motion [4] and specific colors (e.g. 
yellow) [1] to increase the likelihood of attentional capture. 
Luminance, size and frequency of the signal also represent 
potential relevant features to be considered [3]. However, 
improving the saliency of the alert does not guarantee that it 
will attract attention and reach awareness. For instance, 
several experimental studies have revealed that salient but 
unexpected events can remain undetected even when 
presented in the foveal field [5, 14, 19]. This inattentional 
blindness phenomenon also known as attention tunneling 
[21] results from subtle interactions between two correlated 
neural networks, namely the dorsal and ventral pathways. 
The ventral pathway is dedicated to process new stimuli in 
a bottom-up fashion, whereas the dorsal pathways imposes 
a top-down control to focus attention toward task at hand 
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related stimuli. However, under demanding settings, this 
latter pathway may take over the ventral one, thus 
preventing disengagement, shifting and re-orientation of 
attention to process new incoming stimuli [20].  
One efficient way to mitigate attentional tunneling is to 
design cognitive countermeasures. Rather than adding 
alarms, one solution consists in temporarily removing the 
information (e.g. display) on which the human operator is 
excessively focusing and to replace it by an explicit 
notification in their visual field [9]. Therefore, the user 
interface acts as a cognitive prosthesis as it performs the 
attentional disengagement, shifting and re-orientation of 
attention. These cognitive countermeasures were 
successfully tested with pilots [10] and with unmanned 
vehicle operators during attentional tunneling episodes. 
However, this design may not be appropriate for all 
contexts and it should be considered only in extreme cases 
when there is a need to instigate a change in human 
operator strategy [11]. Indeed, such countermeasure should 
not be considered as another form of alert. For instance, 
[12] demonstrated that this information removal drastically 
reduced interruption lag (i.e. reaction time to interrupt the 
primary task to process the alarm) but led to higher 
"resumption lag" (recovery time to resume primary task). 
These considerations demonstrate the complexity of 
designing appropriate solution to mitigate failure of 
attention. 
The objective of the present study is to implement a new 
design inspired by the work of [9, 10] and [12]. This 
countermeasure masks the entire screen for 300 ms using 
red-orange flash with an opacity of 15%, in addition to the 
operational design of notifications. In contrast to [9, 10], 
this countermeasure does not consist of an actual 
information removal, because the aircraft call signs and 
radar frames remain perfectly visible. The design was tested 
with 22 experienced ATCO in the LABY micro-world [13] 
facing highly demanding scenarios with or without the 
countermeasure. Participants were not told about the use of 
the countermeasure so as to assess its immediate effect on 
attentional abilities and acceptability without prior training.  
MATERIAL AND METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-two experienced air traffic controllers were 
recruited (10 women and 12 men, mean age: 43 years, mean 
years of expertise: 15 years). 
Experimental platform and scenarios 
The LABY microworld [13] was used to conduct the 
experiment on a 30 inch-screen (resolution 2560 * 1600 
pixels) similar to the operational ones. This immersive 
environment simulates key features of ATCO activity with 
a high degree of realism in terms of visualization and 
interactions while providing metrics about their behavior. 
Participants had to guide one or several aircraft in dedicated 
paths (grey corridor on figure 1, flows to integrate), 
avoiding potential conflicts with other aircraft in the 
vicinity by setting adequate speed/level/heading (c.f. figure 
2). Aircraft were to be separated in distance and altitude 
and be kept along their path until reaching a specific area 
(see red square, representing the runway on figure 1). 
Participants had to click on any aircraft with the critical 
STCA alert (see figure 1, right bottom corner) to notify 
their detection and then to manage the conflictual 
trajectory. The LABY scenario is built with an editor which 
allows to design the routes and the events to be triggered. 
Metrics such as reaction time and accuracy on events and 
compliance of aircraft on the routes are collected. 
 
Figure 1: LABY screen configured for our experiment 
In this experiment, the LABY micro-world was configured 
to replicate the task of an approach ATCO (Arrivals) on a 
virtual airport commonly used for training. This activity is 
prone to attentional tunneling since the ATCO has to 
integrate multiple flows on the runway axis while 
maintaining separation minima and give altitude orders to 
intercept the landing system. The green circle labelled 
activity hotspot on figure 1 shows where most of ATCO’s 
activity was located according to the airport activity.  
Two challenging scenarios were designed and pre-tested 
with expert ATCO. They involved medium to heavy traffic 
situations dedicated to induce episodes of high mental 
demands and attentional tunneling. Participants were 
required to supervise and guide incoming aircraft through 
six grey corridors surrounding the runway. 
Six STCA alerts were automatically triggered during each 
scenario on aircraft and participants were required to 
acknowledge them as fast as possible and handle the 
conflictual trajectory. In one of the scenarios, the 
participants were assisted with the Red Alert cognitive 
countermeasure whereas in the other one not. 
 
Runway 
Flows to integrate 
Aircraft with 
STCA alert 
Activity hotspot 
 Figure 2: LABY label and heading menu (selected value 350°) 
Red Alert cognitive countermeasure design 
The design of the cognitive countermeasure consisted of a 
300 ms orange-red flash that covering the entire screen with 
a 15% opacity. All tactical information displayed on the 
screen remained visible during the flash.  
 
 
Figure 3: Up - Current notification alert design: a blinking red 
“ALRT” message is displayed on the aircraft label. Down – 
Red Alert countermeasure design: the entire screen is masked 
with a 15% opacity red-orange layer for 300ms. 
Procedure 
Participants sat in a comfortable chair and began to read the 
instructions to interact with LABY (c.f. figure 4). They then 
performed a training exercise to familiarize themselves with 
the use of the micro-world. Once the training completed, 
the volunteers performed the 2 scenarios (15 minutes each). 
Six STCA alerts occurred during each scenario. One 
scenario was presented with the Red Alert countermeasure 
(CM) while the other wasn’t (No CM). The presence or 
absence of the cognitive countermeasure in one of the two 
scenarios was done in random fashion to control for 
potential training and fatigue effects.  
 
Figure 4: Experimental setup 
Measurements 
Subjective measures 
After each scenario, the participants had to fill in the NASA 
TLX to assess their level of mental workload. At the end of 
the experiment, a direct interview was conducted and the 
following questions were asked: did you perceive the 
orange-red flashes, did you understand their purpose and 
were they efficient to alert you. 
Objective measures 
In order to assess the efficiency of the red alert cognitive 
countermeasure, the mean rate of detected STCA alerts, the 
mean time to acknowledge theses alert and the mean 
performance on the primary ATCO task (i.e. guiding and 
maintaining the aircraft within the corridor limits) were 
measured. All statistical analyses were carried out using the 
R software. The p-value threshold for significance was set 
to 0.05 if not otherwise mentioned. When appropriate, post-
hoc comparisons were carried out using the Tukey’s 
Honestly Significant Difference test.  
RESULTS 
Subjective results  
A paired t-test (two tailed) disclosed no significant effect of 
the scenario type (CM vs No CM) on workload as measured 
by NASA-TLX: t(21)=0.10, p=0.9.  
Post experiment debriefing revealed that half of the 
participants (N=11) understood the purpose of the cognitive 
countermeasure. These participants declared that the Red 
Alert enhanced their ability to perceive the STCA 
notification. The other half (N=11) reported that they did 
not understand the purpose of the cognitive 
countermeasure: they declared that they perceived it but 
thought that it was either a failure of the LABY software or 
the screen or that the red flash was dedicated to distracting 
their attention intentionally to increase stress.  
Behavioral results 
We first examined the effect of the design type (Red Alert 
cognitive countermeasure vs classical operation design) on 
STCA alarm perception. A paired t-test (two tailed) (CM, 
no CM) disclosed that the participants significantly detected 
more alarms with the red alert (M=69.4%, SD=28.6%) than 
with the classical operational design (M=57.9%, 
SD=26.4%): t(21)= 2.13,  p<0.05 – see figure 5 .  
 
Figure 5: STCA alarm mean detection rate without the 
cognitive countermeasure (left, “No_CM”) and with the 
cognitive countermeasure (right, “CM”). Bars represent 
standard error 
Further analyses were conducted to investigate potential 
behavioral differences between the group of participants 
who understood the Red Alert cognitive countermeasure 
and the one who did not. The two-way ANOVA 2 (CM vs 
NO CM; Group who understood vs Group who did not 
understood) disclosed a significant CM x GROUP 
interaction effect: F(1,20)= 14.01, p=0.001, η²p=0.12. Post-
hoc analysis revealed that participants who understood the 
cognitive countermeasure perceived more alarms in the CM 
scenario (M=91.7%, SD=10.6%) than the group who did 
not understand the cognitive countermeasure (M=47.0%, 
SD=23.6%) – see figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Impact of the presence of the cognitive 
countermeasure on alarm detection rate depending on the 
group type (i.e. group who understood vs group who did not 
understand the cognitive countermeasure). This figure shows 
that the cognitive countermeasure improved the performance 
of the group who intuitively understood the cognitive 
countermeasure. Bars represent standard error.  
Then analysis to investigate the effect of the design type 
(red alert cognitive countermeasure vs classical operation 
design) was conducted on reaction time to detect the STCA 
alert. The statistical analyses revealed that the participants 
had significant lower mean response time in the CM 
scenario (M=6.4s, SD=4.1s) than in the No-CM (M=9.7s, 
SD=5.7s): t(21)=-2.50, p<0.05s - see figure 7.  
We then ran further analyses to investigate potential 
differences between the mean reaction time of the group of 
participants who understood the red alert cognitive 
countermeasure and the one who did not. The two-way 
ANOVA 2 (CM vs NO CM; Group who understood vs 
Group who did not understand) disclosed a main effect of 
the group (understanding vs non understanding): F(1,20)= 
17.92, p<0.001, η²p =0.29 and of the design type (CM vs no 
CM): F(1,20)= 5.96387825, p<0.01, η²p =0.14. However 
this ANOVA did not reveal a significant CM x GROUP 
interaction effect: F(1,20)= 0.7, p=0.8, η²p=0.01 and thus 
did not allow us to run post-hoc analyses but only to 
perform descriptive statistics. The participants who 
understood the cognitive countermeasure exhibited faster 
mean reaction time in the CM scenario (M=3.6s, SD = 
2.62s) than the group who did not understand the cognitive 
countermeasure (M = 9.5s, SD=5.9s). 
 
 Figure 7: Mean reaction time (in s) to detect the STCA alert  
without the cognitive countermeasure (left, “No_CM”) and 
with the cognitive countermeasure (right, “CM”). Bars 
represent standard error. 
Finally, we conducted analysis to investigate the effect of 
the design type on the primary ATC task (i.e. guiding the 
aircraft within the corridor). The statistical analysis 
revealed no significant effect: F(1,20)=2.1, p=0.16, 
η²p=0.09. Further analysis did not disclose any significant 
difference between the group who understood the red alert 
cognitive countermeasure and the group who did not. 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to implement a cognitive 
countermeasure, dedicated to mitigate attentional tunneling 
in the context of air traffic control. Based on previous 
studies [9, 10, 12], a new design based on the display of an 
orange-red flash with a 15% opacity masking the entire 
screen for 300 ms was proposed. The rationale was to 
induce attentional disengagement from the primary task and 
to shift and re-orient the locus of attention onto the STCA 
alert. The color of the cognitive countermeasure is the same 
as the STCA alert notification so as to induce a priming 
effect [7]. The efficiency of this design was tested by 
placing ATCO in a realistic situation under demanding 
attentional setting. 
The results of this experiment revealed that our scenarios 
were efficient to induce attentional tunneling as our 
participants missed almost 42% of STCA alerts in the 
scenario without countermeasure. When perceived, STCA 
alerts led to relatively long reaction time (~10s). This study 
confirms previous findings [12] and conclusions from the 
French Board for Safety events analysis that failure of 
attention can take place in the context of ATC even with 
highly trained controllers. Consistently with the hypotheses, 
the analyses disclosed that the use of the cognitive 
countermeasure significantly improved detection rate of the 
alert while reducing reaction time when understood.  
Interestingly enough, the Red Alert cognitive 
countermeasure did not decrease the performance on the 
primary task (i.e. guiding the aircraft within the corridor). 
This is an important point as [12] showed that a previous 
design based on information removal, while inducing 
higher alarm detection rate, had a deleterious effect on the 
primary task performance when compared to the classical 
operational design. Moreover, one could expect that the 
cognitive countermeasure led to lower mental workload as 
measured by NASA-TLX. The results did not disclose such 
evidences. A plausible explanation is that the subjective 
rating of the participants only account for the management 
of the challenging primary task no matter the presence or 
absence of the cognitive countermeasure. The brief 
occurrence of only six STCA/cognitive countermeasures 
was not enough to modulate the global perceived workload. 
One other research question was to assess whether this new 
design could be intuitively processed without any training. 
The post-experiment debriefing session revealed that half of 
our participants intuitively understood the cognitive 
countermeasure whereas the others declared it confused 
them. When looking at the performance of these two 
groups, it appeared that the one who positively reacted to 
the cognitive countermeasure almost missed no alerts and 
showed a reaction time reduced by a factor of 2.6 when 
compared to the scenario without the countermeasure. The 
group who did not understand the cognitive countermeasure 
did not exhibit behavioral differences with or without the 
Red Alert countermeasure. These findings indicate that 
training is necessary since the design does not direct the 
gaze towards a specific area. However, the high 
performance of the group who understood the cognitive 
countermeasure shows that it can lead to great efficiency 
and considerably improve operational safety. 
Future work should focus on conducting more experiments 
with a higher sample of participants facing different types 
of scenarios to confirm our findings. Eventually, one should 
consider potential habituation effects if the occurrence of 
the Red Alert becomes high. The use of a GLSL shader 
could be considered to overcome this issue as the alert 
images will be designed in a slightly different way each 
time it is presented to the ATCO. Eventually, the 
integration of eye tracking [16, 17] and portable monitoring 
device [11] open promising perspective to detect failure of 
attention in real time so as to close the loop and trigger 
cognitive countermeasure in an adaptive fashion [2]. 
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